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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETTE DEANE TREMAY-NE, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
ROY E. TREMAYNE, 
AppelZant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7348 
The brief of appellant ignores the court rule which 
required appellant to make a complete statement of the 
facts. It is, therefore, necessary that the respondent do 
so. 
THE FAC·T·S 
Plaintiff and defendant were married December 19, 
1941, (R. 90). He had finished three years of college 
and had a normal degree which entitled him to a teacher's 
certificate. He was teaching in Rupert, Idaho, (R. 90). 
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She had not completed her last year of high school (R. 
189). Shortly after the marriage, the defendant quit 
teaching and enlisted in the Navy. The parties moved to 
California and his wife sought employment, first in a 
restaurant (R. 91) and later in a drug store (R. 92). 
Fro1n that tiu1e forward until the time of the divorce 
' ?\[rs. Tre1nayne was gainfully employed (R. 94 and 96) 
except for one nine month period when both of them at-
tended the Utah Agricultural College at Logan (R. 99) 
and other short periods of time while she was attempting 
to find work after plaintiff and defendant had moved to 
a ne'v town. While the defendant was in the Navy he 
set up a saving schedule, requiring the plaintiff to save 
at least $200.00 per month (R. 94 and 188). When he 
first enlisted in the Navy, he was earning only $75.00 
per month. Later his pay was increased so that he was 
receiving approximately $180.00 per month (R. 213). 
He sent part of his earnings home to his wife, and she 
saved all that he sent (R. 188). She then saved suffi-
cient from her own earnings to make the total amount 
saved $200.00 ,per month (R. 188). In this manner the 
parties saved in excess of $5,000.00 and had that amount 
on hand when he left the service (R. 96). When ~Ir. 
Tremayne first left the service the parties moved to 
Mountain Home, Idaho, where he taught school for one 
school year. His wife, at his insistence, (R. 173) pro-
cured a job at a bank where she earned $90.00 p·er month 
(R. 98). At the time defendant was discharged from the 
Navy, he purchased a car (R. 97) but with their addi-
tional savings during their stay at Mountain Home, the 
I I 
j j 
1 ~ 
I i 
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$5,000.00 in saYings ''Tas still substantially intaet \vhen 
they started school at Logan (1~. 99). Both of then1 at-
tended school for three quarters at Logan (R. 99). There-
after, the plaintiff \Yas required to quit school and go 
to work. The parties left school at Logan in June of 
19-±7 and the defendant elected to go to Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, where he attended the University of California 
(R. 101). He attended the University at Berkeley one 
semester which would be equivalent to about a quarter 
and one half of schooling (R. 101). While the defend-
ant attended school at Berkeley, the plaintiff continued 
to work. 'She had a good job at the Bank of America and 
did not want to leave it (R. 102). The defendant wanted 
to leave California and return to Utah, so plaintiff gave 
up her job and returned with him. 'The defendant then 
attended the University of Utah for four full quarters 
(R. 107). Again the plaintiff obtained employment in 
the First National Bank and later at the University of 
Utah (R. 106). The defendant by that time had earned 
sufficient credits to entitle him to a Masters Degree. 
He had not yet completed his thesis (R. 109) but it was 
fifty per cent complete (R. 110). A student working 
under normal conditions can obtain a Masters Degree in 
three quarters of intensive work, after he obtains his 
Bachelor's Degree (R. 109). Nearly all of them get 
Master's Degrees in four quarters (R. 109). The defend-
ant attended four quarters at the University of Utah 
and one and one half quarters at the University of Cali-
fornia but still he had not completed the work for his 
l\Iaster's Degree (R. 110). During all of the time ex-
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cept the period of time at the Utah State Agricultural 
College at Logan, his wife worked full time, maintained 
the apartment, cooked the meals at home, and also did 
all of the laundry ( R. 171). During the seven years o.f 
their married life, the parties moved a total of 22 times, 
and each time the plaintiff was required to re-establish 
herself in employment (R. 234). She was unable either 
to establish seniority in a job or to increase her earning 
power. 
During the time the defendant was in the service, 
he urged plaintiff to live frugally, forego the purchase of 
new clothing and save all the money she could save 
so that they could both go to school. H.e also assured 
her that when he returned he would arrange to get her 
new clothing (R. 95 and 197). The evidence is that 
she did so live and that during most of that time the 
clothing that she wore was clothing which she owned 
before her marriage. She testified that she looked 
"shabby" ( R. 17 and 197). He testified that the G. I. 
Bill of Rights paid him $90.00 per month at first and 
later $105.00 per month, but that thi.s was not sufficient 
to support. him and his wife while he attended school 
(R. 30). Had his wife not worked while he attended 
school, it was his opinion that there would have been 
no p.rop·erty whatever left at the time of the divorce 
(R. 128 and 129). 
It is interesting to note the nature of the property 
which the parties aequired. Both parties testified that 
he objected to her using her money to purchase p·ersonal 
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iten1s for herself (R. 12:~ and 171) .... -\t the sa1ne thne 
he purchased an auton1obile for $800.00 (R. 7). He also 
purchased a car-trailer for $65.00 '""hich '""ould have been 
convenient for use in his frequent hunting trips (R. 189). 
He purchased t'Yo guns while he was attending school 
(R. 126) and expended a total of $166.00 therefor (R. 
150). They owned a type,vriter which was needed by 
him in connection with his school work (R. 222) ; a li-
brary consisting of many books, but according to his 
testimony, they were books that had peculiar value to 
him and in which she would have little interest (R. 
223). He carried a life insurance .policy. Her money 
was in part used to pay the premiums, but at all times 
he insisted that the beneficiary named in th·e policy be his 
mother rather than his wife (R. 121). They also had a 
washing machine so that his wife could do the laundry 
at home (R. 171). They had practically no social life 
(R. 179) and he objected to her taking dancing because 
it cost too much (R. 192). 
His wife desired to go to s·chool when he completed 
his schooling at the University of Utah (R .. 192). He 
advised her she had all the education she needed and 
that she should continue working to help acquire a home. 
He then made it known to his wife that he considered 
himself to be her intellectual superior and constantly re-
ferred to her lack of Hducation (R. 168). He thus in-
duced his wife to deprive herself of even the normal per-
sonal effects, to wear ''shabby clothes'', to move from 
base to base and town to town with him a total of 22 
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times ( R. 234). He insisted that in each of the new lo-
cations she procure work (R. 173) and that her earnings 
be accounted for (R. 94 and 188). He loafed through 
school and after six quarters of graduate work he had 
not completed the work for a Master's Degree and he 
admits that practically all political science students com-
plete their Master's Degree in four quarters and that 
many are able to do it in three (R. 109). He also had 
3 quarters of undergraduate school at Logan. Having 
completed such education as he desired, (a total of 27 
months in school), he refused further ·education to his 
wife (R. 192). Then through what the court has ad-
judicated to be his fault, he caused his wife to procure 
a divorce so that she could not participate in the bene-
fits of the education which she gave him. ;The meagre 
property which they had accumulated under his own 
testimony would have been non-existent hut for her work 
(R. 128) yet he demanded that he be given one-half 
thereof; that his education be totally disregarded and 
even went so far as to urge at the trial that his wife 
sell her wedding and engagement rings and give him 
half the proceeds from the sale (R. 233.). He now puts 
her to the exp·ens;e of an appeal where the total difference 
between what his prayer asks for and what the court 
awarded him is less than $375.00. 
It is clearly demonstrated by the record that the 
additional college ·education which he received while these 
parties were married is worth at least $640.00 per year 
(R. 156). In this regard Mr. Hardy of the State Board 
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of Education testified that in the l\l urray School Dis-. 
trict and in every other sehool district in the state, 
there are basic salary schedules which are paid to 
teachers depending on the amount of formal education 
that thev have had. In l\Iurra.v the basic salary for a 
. .. 
teacher with less than four years of college is $2090; 
"ith a Bachelor's D·egree, it is $2630, and with a Master's 
Degree, it is $2730. Since the defendant has the equival-
ent of a Master's Degree this additional education was 
worth $640.00 to him during the first year since the 
divorce and will continue to be worth at least that much 
to him .per year throughout the remainder of his life 
(R. 156). His present salary of $2700.00 (R. 111) to-
gether with his own testimony that he has more than 
sufficient credit hours for a Master's Degree (R. 107-
110) indicates th~t the school district is placing such a 
value on his additional education. From another ap-
proach, it seems clear that the combined efforts of these 
two people throughout seven years of married life have 
all been invested in his education, and the record is clear 
that at least the $5,000.00 in savings, plus her continued 
earnings were so utilize-d (R. 231). 
The plaintiff is in a less fortunate position. She 
moved sixteen times while he was in the service and 
several time-s thereafter (R. 96 and 234). In each in-
stance she was required to give up~ her job and find new 
employment. ·She was seventeen years old when she was 
married, had less than a high school education and has 
not been able to improve her earning power since that 
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time (R. 190). Her chances of a successful remarriage 
are depreciated by the seven years she devoted to this 
. 
n1arr1age. 
The parties separated in N oven1ber, 1948. The de-
fendant continued to reside in the old apartment. The 
plaintiff found new living quarters and had the expense 
incident to moving (R. 209). She was earning take-home-
pay of $110.00 per month and gross pay of $160.00 per 
month (R. 105). He was earning gross pay of $230.00 
per month and take home pay of $180.00 (R. 110). Thus 
during November, December, January and February 
while they were still man and wife he had $70.00 more 
per month to live on than she did or a total of $480.00 
(R. 233). This was considered by the trial court (R. 37). 
In addition, the defendant had been unemployed dur-
ing all of 1948 until about the time of their more serious 
divorce discussion. At that time he quit school at the 
University of Utah so that he could support himself. 
U·p until that time his wife, being the sole breadwinner, 
had claimed the defendant as a dependent for income 
tax p·urp·oses. ·When he started to work in September, 
he ~!aimed himself as a dependent and the final result 
was that her employer had not withheld sufficient moneys 
from her salary from January 1st to September 1st and 
she was required to pay additional income tax on wages 
earned from January to 'September, 1948. These wages 
were used both by plaintiff and defendant for his educa-
tion. The legal deduction which 'the Murray School Dis-
trict would be required by law to deduct from his salary 
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'vould exceed the an1ount of his ultimate tax because he 
only ""'"orked five months. He thus would get a tax re- · 
ftmd, the amount of 'vhich does not appear in the record, 
and she had a tax deficiency of from $45.00 to $50.00 
'vhich the court compelled her to assume (R. 65, 86, 174, 
37). 
From the time of the November separation until the 
date of the trial the defendant held possession of all 
the .property except the radio (R. 202). Even items like 
the washing machine he kept and delivered to his own 
parents (R. 132). He thus had the exclusive use of the 
property from November to February. Thereafter, it 
took an order to show cause and several garnishments 
to compel even token compliance with the judgment of 
the court. He filed his appeal on impecunious affidavit 
and even to this day has deprived her of the benefits 
of the judgment by depositing the alimony and payments 
for further property settlement with the clerk of the 
court without ever having obtained a court order per-
mitting him to do so. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF· ERROR ON CRO·SS· APPEAL 
The plaintiff and respondent assigns the following 
errors in support of her cross appeal: 
1. The Court Erred In Awarding To The Defend-
ant Any Property. 
2. The Court Erred in Finding That The Type-
writer Ha.d a Value Of $100.00. 
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3. The Court Erred In Finding That The Auto-
mobile Had A Value Of Only $500.00. 
4. The Court Erred In Finding That The Library 
Books Had A Value Of Only $50.00. 
Each of the above assignments of error is· based on 
the grounds that the court's finding and conclusions 
thereon are contrary to law and are against the evidence. 
ARGUMFJNT 
1. THE DIVISION OF JOINT PROPERTY UPON THE GRANTING OF 
A DIVORCE RESTS IN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The right to a divorce and the law relating thereto 
is and from the very beginning has been statutory. This 
is too well settled to require citation of authority. In 
regard to the division of property the court is controlled 
by the· Statutes. The particular section relating to the 
division of property is Sec:tion 40-3-5, Ut,ah Code An-
not:ate.d, 1943, which ~provides : 
''When a decree of divorce is made the court 
may make such order in relation to ... property 
... and the maintenance of the parties ... as may 
be equitable." 
There is thus no standard prescribed. The court 
is simply to do what it deems just and equitable. Under 
such a circumstance, where no definite standards are 
fixed, it is uniformly held throughout all jurisdictions 
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that the n1atter rests in the sound discretion of the trial 
judge. 
This has been expressly affirmed in Utah in several 
recent opinions. See ..:.4.llen vs. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 
P. 2nd 872; Anderson vs. Anaerson., 104 Utah 104, 138 
P. 2nd 252; and Woolley vs. vVoolley, (Utah), 19·5 P. 2nd 
743. In Allen vs. Allen, supTta, the question on appeal 
related solely to alimony and property division. The 
court asked the question : 
'' \V.hen should the appellate court in divorce 
proceedings vacate the findings and decree of the 
trial court and substitute its judgment for that 
of the judge who observed the demeanor of the 
,parties and witnesses and heard the testimony, 
when the appeal relates only to the determination 
of alimony and division of property.'' 
The court then said: 
''There are numerous ·decisions of this court 
holding that the Supreme Court will not substi-
tute its judgment in a divorce proceeding relative 
to alimony and division of prop·erty for that of 
the trial court unless the record clearly discloses 
that the trial court's decree in such matters is 
plainly arbitrary.'' 
The other cases are to the same effect. They are in 
harmony with prior Utah holdings and with the uniform 
holdings of the courts of all of the Western jurisdictions. 
See Ra~te~son vs. Patterson (Arizona), 163 P. 2nd 850; 
l3w~eeley vs. Sw:eeley, (California), 170 P. 2nd 670; Zo10:k 
vs. Zook, (Colorado), 195 P. 2nd 387; Fish vs. Fish, 
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(Idaho), 170 P. 2nd 802; Gates vs. Gates, (Kansas), 163 
P. 2nd 395; Strickland vs. Strickland, (Oregon), 192 P. 
2nd, 986; and OZark vs. ,Cla,rk, (Washington), 199 P. 2nd 
67. "\\Te, therefore, are confronted at the outset with the 
fact that the trial court has great discretion in matters 
of this kind. Here there is no appeal from the part of 
the judgment awarding the divorce to the plaint1ff. The 
appeal relates solely to the division of property. 
The Utah Sup-reme Court has ,enumerated the 
various items which it considers important in determin-
ing whether or not a particular property division is rea-
sonable and equitable. These matters have been set forth 
in several opinions, namely, Anderson vs. Anderson, 
supra.; Allevn vs. Allen, supra; and Pinion ·vs. Piwi;on, 92 
Utah 2·55, 67 P. 2nd 265. These items as listed are: 
'' (1) Ages of the parties when married. 
(2) Duration of marriage. (3) What did the 
parties surrender or give up by marriage. 4. What 
property, if any, did the parties contribute upon 
marriage. ( 5) The amount of property and kind 
now held by the parties. (6) The ability and 
opportunities of each party to earn money. (7) 
Financial condition and necessities of each party, 
including abilities to save and care for earnings. 
(8) Health of the parties. (9) The standard or 
mode of living of the parties.'' 
In regard to the ages of the parties, the plaintiff was 
seventeen at the time of the marriage and the defend-
ant twenty three, so they are still relatively young and 
have much of their lives before them. 
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The 1narriage endured fro1n Decen1ber 19, 1941, to 
February, 1949, or a period of over seven years. To the 
writer of this brief, this seems to be a substantial period 
of time when it is considered that the total effort of 
the parties during that entire period of time was di-
rected toward his education, and the ~p,laintiff deprived 
herself of the normal personal privileges and pleasures 
of a young married couple to make this result possible. 
In answer to the question ''What ·did the parties 
surrender or give up by marriage~'' we state the follow-
ing: The plaintiff left high s-chool before completing it. 
She utilized the period of her life that normally would 
have been devoted to further education and cultural de-
velopment. It is this period between seventeen and 
twenty-four when young people normally get the neces-
sary education to equip them to earn a livelihood later 
in life. It is also during this ip,eriod that a girl's chances 
of marriage are best. The defendant had completed three 
years of college, he was slated for duty with the Armed 
Services and had everything to gain and nothing to lose 
from the marriage. 
Neither of the parties had any property at the time 
they were married. The property which they acquired 
during the marriage is meagre. Its acquisition was made 
possible entirely because of the willingness of the plain-
tiff to live frugally, work hard, and remain employed 
\\~hile ·her husband went to school. Except for this, even 
under his own testimony, there would have been no 
assets to divide. 
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In regard to the ability and opportunities of each 
party to earn money, it should be noted that the defend-
ant is now equipped with his Master's Degree which has 
substantial~present cash value to him in his school teach-
ing profession. The plaintiff has worked at many jobs 
in many areas and has not been able to improve her 
earning capacity at all. She has not established seniority 
in any job nor established the good will of any employer. 
In fact, her frequent moves and her inability to stay 
fixed on any job has undoubtedly given her a reputation 
among employers of being unstable and undependable. 
Her present take home pay of $110.00 per month is cer-
tainly inadequate to pay for her present living and to 
procure further education. With a property division 
which would give her the property which has been ac-
quired, and by this, I mean all of it, she might have 
be·en able by working days and attending school at 
night -to get further education. ·She certainly can not 
ever do as the defendant did, simply discontinue all work 
and go to school for twenty~eight months. This would 
not be possible even were she given all the property. 
She could, however, if awarded all of the property, pay 
her tuition at some school, acquire books and attend 
night school where she could improve her earning capa-
city. 
Plaintiff's present necessities are now greater than 
defendant's for she must attempt to get an education. 
There is ~every indication that the plaintiff has the 
ability to save and care for money and no indication that 
the defendant lacks these attributes. Each must provide 
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hin1self with the comn1on necessities of life. The defend-
ant is no"r better equipped to do this than is the plain-
tiff. It should be noted that the plaintiff has the neces-
sity of procuring clothing and personal ~effects for be-
cause of her frugal living during the years of her mar-
riage, she did not acquire the personal effects and cloth-
ing that normally would be acquired in a marriage of 
this duration. 
Both parties appear to be in good health. The de-
sires of the parties for the finer things in life a~ppear 
to be well cultivated, but their financial ability to ac-
quire and enjoy the better things in lif,e has always been 
hampered by the necessity of keeping the defendant in 
school. 
On the strength of th·e above and in view of the fact 
that defendant was found by the court to he the party 
at fault, we submit that the court should have awarded 
to the plaintiff a larger percentage of the p.rop·erty. Even 
with all the property she will never be able to equal the·: 
education for hers-elf that she helped the defendant ac-
quire. The defendant has already acquired his education 
and established a good earning capacity. Any needs 
which he has in the future can be ~easily met hy his pres-
ent earning power. He needs no further education and, 
should have no further ·expense in ~equi,pping himself to 
meet the p~roblems of life. She has all of that expense 
ahead of her and a smaller earning capacity. Her only 
hope of acquiring an ·education is in the property which 
her earnings acquired. The court cannot give her a 
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college education, which she wants so much, but it can· 
give her the means by which she can acquire it. She 
is cultured a~d refined and craves a higher education 
and an opportunity to live a cultured social life. 'Sihe 
will never be able to attain that objective through her 
own earnings because she has never had the training 
necessary to create a higher earning power. It was 
through her effort that the defendant obtained his pres-
ent advantageous position. It is also through her ·ef-
forts that the meagre property which they acquired is 
in existence. But for her, his education could only have 
been gotten through incurring indebtedness. Had she 
not worked, he would have had to forego his education 
or go in debt to get it and this fight would he over the 
obligation of the parties to ~pay the family debts rather 
than over the division of the property. We are sincere 
in urging to the court that it award to th~ plaintiff all 
of the property and feel that it is the only just and 
equitable thing which can be done. However, the plain-
tiff would never have appealed had not the defendant 
prosecuted his appeal and worked as he did to prevent 
her from realizing anything on any of this property. 
The above dis!poses of the first assignm·ent of error. 
The other four are only of importance if the court 
. . 
~ 
concludes that the defendant should be awarded some of 
the property. If it so concludes, then we submit that the 
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trial court placed too low a value on the property which 
it awarded to the defendant and placed too high a value 
on some of the property awarded to the plaintiff. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VALUING THE TYPEWRITER AT 
$100.00. 
By its finding number six the trial court found that 
the typewriter was now worth $100.00. It cost only 
$100.00 new (R. 144). Defendant testified that it was 
only worth $75.00 '(R. 144), and this is the only testimony 
on this i tern. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AUTOMOBILE WAS 
WORTH ONLY $500.00. 
At the trial the plaintiff testified that in her opinion 
the car was worth more than $500.00 and she wanted 
to take the car if it was to be valued so low (R. 205). 
An expert was called to fix the value of the car. He 
testified that it could be sold to a used car lot for $500.00, 
but if sold by a used car lot it would bring $650.00 (R. 
227). If the car could be sold at a ·retail price of $650.00, 
that was its value. Certainly the value of a .p~roduct is 
not what it can be sold for wholesale t:o a dealer. Had 
the car been advertised and sold directly to a prospectiv·e 
purchaser who intended to utilize it for his own use, 
rather than for resale, this expert fixed its value at 
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$650.00. Had plaintiff desired to purchase a car like it, 
that is what she would have been required to pay. 
Of course, the plaintiff would not want the car now 
at a value of $650.00. The used car market has dropped 
considerably and the car has been utilized by the defend-
ant since the date of the trial. Yet it still is clear from 
the record that at the time of the trial the car was 
actually worth $650.00 and that it very likely could have 
been turned into that much cash. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LIBRARY BOOKS 
WERE WORTH ONLY $50.00. 
The evidence showed that there were sixty-one books 
which had been acquired by the parties (R .. 58). Plain-
tiff testified that many of them had as much value to 
her as they did to the defendant and that she would like 
to have some of them (R. 203). On cross examination of 
an expert witness called by the defendant, the court told 
counsel for the plaintiff not to proceed with his cross 
examination on this item for the court would accept the 
value of $15.00 .placed on the hooks by the defendant's 
expert and would award them to the plaintiff (R. 225). 
In reliance upon this statement counsel for plaintiff dis-
continued all further cross examination of the witness. 
Then the court awarded the books to the defendant 
at a value of only $50.00. 
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The court's a\va.rd may be summarized as follows: 
To Plaintiff 
Radio ------------------------------------·----------------------------$ 400.00 
Typewriter ----------------------------------------------·------- 100.00 
"T' asl1er ------------------------------------------------------------ 7 5.00 
Insurance Policy ------------------------------------------ 51.00 
Cash ------------------------------------·------------------ ___ ------- 125.00 
Terminal Leave Bond____________________________________ 425.00 
Alimony and further settlement--------------~--- 475.00 
$1651.00 
Less Income Tax Payable ---------------------------- 45.00 
Total _____ ------- ______________________ --------------------... $1606.00 
To Defenma;n;t 
Car Trailer ----~-----------------------------------------------$ 50.00 
Automobile --------------------------------------------------- 500.00 
Boo·ks --------------------------------------------------·------------ 50.00 
Guns ------------------------------------------------·---------------- 130.00 
Insurance Policy --------------------------------·------------ 151.00 
$881.00 
With the above it must also be remembered that 
the defendant received one insurance policy that had no 
determined cash surrender value, but it was a $1,000.00 
twenty-pay-life insurance policy which had been in force 
several years and it certainly had some value (R. 238). 
Had the court granted the defendant's prayer it would 
have awarded him one half of $2487.00, less the value of 
this insurance policy. In other words, about $1200.00. 
The $881.00 plus the.insurance policy makes a difference 
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between his prayer and the court's actual award of only 
about $350.00. Had the court put the value on the pro-
perty that it should have the ty,pewriter would have been 
reduced to $75.00 and the plaintiff would then have had 
only $1581.00. The car would have been increased to 
$650.00 and the books at least another $50.00. This raises 
defendant's award to $1081 plus the insurance policy. 
This would have been so close to the result actually 
prayed for by the defendant's answer that the differ-
ence would not have paid half the costs of this appeal! 
We submit that the court was more liberal to the 
defendant than it should have been. Any modification 
which is made of the judgment should be in favor of 
a larger award to the plaintiff. To reduce the amount 
awarded to the plaintiff would be a palpable injustice. 
PART II. THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
1. THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY BY THE COURT WAS NOT UN-
F,AIR TO THE DEFENDANT. 
We now turn to an analysis of the arguments ad~ 
vanced by the defendant on his appeal. His first con-
tention is that the court awarded the defendant too little 
of the joint property. Insofar as the facts are con-
cerned, this has already been fully covered above. In 
regard to the law, the defendant relies entirely on the 
case of Lwndgreen V's. Lwndgreen, 184 P. 2d. 670. That 
case could not possibly be of help here. There both 
parties had been married previously. H·ere was a mar-
riage between a seventeen year old high school girl 
and a twenty-three year old school teacher. There the 
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parties were over seventy years of age, and the joint 
property came from relief cheeks which were payable 
to both. Neither had obtained any great benefit from the 
marriage and the court divided the property equally. 
Counsel for the defendant argued below and again on 
appeal that this Lundgreen case requires that the pro-
perty be divided equally. Such simply is not its holding. 
Each divorce case is judged on its own facts. The court 
must make an award that is equitable and in determin-
ing what is equitable the nine things, among others, set 
forth in Allen vs. Allen, su,pra, are to a large extent 
controlling. There is no authority cited by defendant 
that even suggests a result contrary to that urged b~ 
plaintiff under part one of this brief. 
2. THE TERMINAL LEAVE BOND. 
The second contention of the defendant is that the 
court erred in its judgment relating to the terminal leave 
bond. We simply cannot understand why the defendant 
makes this contention now. At the trial he was asked 
specifically if he wanted the terminal leave bond to be 
considered in the property division and he answered tha.t 
he did (R. 133). He w~s asked: 
"Q. You weren't going to put in your war 
bond you got when mustered out, were you. 
A. That's right. Q. You were going to keep that1 
A. Not necessarily; I was going to divide with 
her, fifty-fifty on everything." 
The terminal leave bond is also set out in the complaint 
as the part of the joint property. (See paragraph 6, R. 
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4.) The allegations of paragrap-h six are admitted by 
paragraph three of the answer (R. 15). The answer 
then prays for an equal division of that property which, 
as noted, included this terminal leave bond. It should 
also be noted that the court asked defendant to enumer-
ate the property which he wanted. The defendant did 
so and specifically included the car and the terminal 
leave bond in the property that he wanted the court to 
award to him (R. 222). It is thus clear that at no time 
in the court below did the defendant prior to the court's 
judgment indicate that he contended that this- bond was 
not part of the property to be disposed of. 
Next it is to he noted that the court did not order 
the defendant to t.urn the bond over to the plaintiff .. What 
was ordered was that the defendant "cash the terminal 
leave bond held by him with the approximate value of 
$425.00 and to pay to the plaintiff the proceeds thereof 
including interest, or in the alternative to pay to the 
plaintiff the equivalent amount in cash" (R. 40). No 
time is fixed for the payment. The court simply dete·r-
mined that the plaintiff was to have that amount out of 
the ·joint prop·erty. It could be paid either by cashing 
the bond or from other sources. The contention that 
this was the only source from which defendant could 
have paid it is. not correct. The actual value of the other 
property awarded to him was nearly $900.00. Further, 
he was employed and with no time having been fixed 
for the ~p'ayment, he could have paid it from earnings. 
When later counsel for defendant advised counsel for 
the plaintiff that he was not going to comply with the 
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order of the court unless compelled to do so a petition 
for an order to show cause "'"as filed ( R. 24 7). It alleged 
that defendant's counsel had advised that he was not 
going to comply with the court's order but would resist 
it by every legal means (R. 46). The defendant then 
sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the hearing of 
the order to show cause. The Supreme Court denied this 
petition for a writ of prohibition (R. 243). The trial court 
then brought the order to show cause on for hearing. 
The defendant was ordered to bring the bond with him 
to court. Instead he deposited money with the clerk of 
the court (R. 50). It does not appear whether the money 
was from the bond or otherwise. 
Thus while the court ordered defendant to bring 
the bond to court, it neither ordered him to cash it nor 
to surrender its proceeds to plaintiff. It only re-
quired him to .p~ay the proceeds or in the alternative 
to pay an equal amount of cash from some other source. 
It was only after defendant indicated that he was not 
going to comp~y with the court's order that any attempt 
was made to assert direct jurisdiction over the bond. 
The actual taking of jurisdiction never materialized b·e-
cause the defendant deposited an equal amount of cash. 
Even were the order to be construed as a judgment 
awarding the bond to the p·laintiff, it does not follow 
that the court erred. In the first place the statute quoted 
by the defendant does not say that the existence of he 
bond as an asset must be ignored in entering a divorce 
decree. It is doubtful that the statute was intended to 
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But giving the statute the meaning that defendant con-
tends for it, it still leaves the trial court free to consider 
the fact that the hond is in existence. The court is not 
required to "shut its eyes" to the fact that the bond 
exists. It should make an equitable division of the pro-
perty and in doing so should consider the existence of 
the bond. Had the defendant raised this contention in the 
court below there is every reason to believe that the 
court would have awarded the plaintiff the car and other 
property in lieu of the bond. In fact it did not award her 
the bond-it just awarded her a certain amount of cash 
to be paid from the proceeds of the bond or otherwise. 
The cross appeal will, of course, enable this court to 
make such adjustment of the property as it deems fit. If 
under any possible construction the statute relied upon 
by defendant has been violated, which we strongly deny, 
then the court has before it all provisions of the lower 
court's judgment and could award the car and other pro-
perty to plaintiff or could order a straight cash payment 
in lieu of the bond. This latter, we submit, the trial court 
has already done. 
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The last contention of the defendant is that the court 
erred in awarding a fifty dollar attorney fee on the order 
to show cause. The record is clear that the defendant 
'vas in violation of the court's judgment. The court had 
ordered defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $35.00 
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before ~larch 1, 1949. It had also awarded her p.roperty 
that ",.as still in his possession. Defendant, through his 
counsel, had filed notice of appeal and had been advised 
that unless he procured a stay bond pending appeal, 
plaintiff would enforce the judgment (R. 247). No stay 
bond was filed. Co:unsel for defendant apparently had 
the mistaken idea that the statutes gave him five days 
within 'vhich to file a "Stay Bond" (R. 247). The five 
days allowed by law, is of course, for the filing of a 
'~Cost Bond'' on appeal. The judgment is not stayed by 
the appeal or by the Cost Bond. It is stayed only by com-
plying with Title 104, Chapter 41, U.C.A. 1943. This the 
defendant had not done nor has he done so to this date. 
The plaintiff, therefore, brought her order to show caus·e 
which was issued March 2, 1949 (R. 50). The defendant 
sought a writ of ~prohibition on which plaintiffs attorney 
appeared and successfully defeated. The hearing was 
then had on the order to show cause. By this time the 
defendant had complied with part of the court order in 
that he had deposited with the clerk of the court $459.34 
representing the value of the bond. It does not app·ear 
whether defendant cashed the bond or p·rocured. the 
cash elsewhere. ~But it was deposited (R. 61). The de-
fendant was also compelled to deposit the title to the 
car with the clerk of the court. The court found that the 
defendant had "failed to obey the order of the court, 
but his failure was not with a willful intent to disobey 
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the court order, but in reliance upon advice of counsel 
that he need not pay it" (R. 61). For that reason he 
was not punished for contempt of court. The court then 
directed defendant to pay the $35.00 installment, which 
should have been paid on March 1, 1949, on March 15, 
1949. 
We submit that the order to show cause was neces-
sary; that the defendant had failed to obey the -court's 
order; that the bringing of the order to show cause 
resulted in substantial compliance with the order of 
the court and that the work of plaintiff's attorney in 
accomplishing the above was worth more than the $50.00. 
allowed. 
Defendant's brief gives the impression that the de-
fendant was found to he without fault and for that rea-
son he was not punished for contempt. ·The fact is that 
he was in violation of the court's order, but the violation 
was upon advice of counsel and not wilful. The court 
therefore simply ordered comp·liance with its prior order 
and excused the defendant's violation. 
CONCLUSIO:N 
The trial court's order dividing the joint property 
Is ~presumptively correct. It will only be modified if 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion. If any abuse 
of discretion is involved it was in awarding to the de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
fendant too mueh of the eommunity property. Even 
if all of it were awarded to the plaintiff she could not 
procure for herself the years of college training that her 
earnings, \vork and frugal living enabled the defendant 
to acquire. By their joint efforts his earning capacity 
\Vas greatly enhanced. Then, because of his wrongs, she 
was prohibited from reaping the benefits of that en-
hanced earning power. There is little that the court 
can do to remedy the injustice that has been done her 
for little property was acquired. It can, however, and 
should award her a larger percentage of the joint pTo-
perty. 
There are at least three reasons why the argument 
on the terminal leave bond is unsound: (1) It is raised 
for the first time on appeal. (2) It misconstrues the 
court order which simp,ly does not award the bond to 
the plaintiff, It awarded her cash equal to the value of 
the bond. (B) There is no error for the court can in any 
event consider the existence of the bond in making its 
equitable division of joint property. 
The $50.00 award of attorneys fees was correct for 
the defendant had violated the court order and only 
by affirmative action could compliance be obtained. His 
actions caused the order to show cause to issue and its 
h;:-:;uance assured compliance with the court order. It is 
only fair that the expense of that proceedings be borne 
by him. 
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Last, the court should award to the plaintiff at least 
another $200.00 for attorneys fees on this appeal. The 
$150 already paid was to the extent of ap·proximate $50.00 
used for printing this brief and paying the costs of 
the ·cross appeal. The balance of $100.00 is simply not 
adequate for the work done on the appeal and for the 
work done since the order to show cause by way of 
garnishments. 'l'he plaintiff therefore respectfully sub-
mits that an additional $200.00 should be allowed as at-
torneys fees on this appeal. 
Respectfuliy submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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